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63 
Net Neutrality and the European Union’s 
Copyright Directive for the Digital Single 
Market 
BY NATHAN GUZÉ** 
 Abstract: The European Union’s Copyright Directive for the 
Digital Single Market should cause concern for net neutrality advocates. 
This article casts a critical gaze at Article 17 (previously Article 13) of 
this new Directive. It chronicles the Directive’s life: starting as a 
reaction to the perceived inadequate copyright protections provided by 
the previous Information Society Copyright Directive through to its 
then-present status circa May 2019. Next, net neutrality is defined, and 
its benefits and detriments are weighed to ultimately determine the 
policy is desirable. Article 17’s call for eliminating safe-harbor 
provisions for content hosts and its call for content filters signal 
opposition to net neutrality, despite the European Union’s supposed 
support for this policy. This new Copyright Directive seeks to support 
all creators, but it will only further entrench support for remunerative 
efforts towards those who can finance enforcement efforts: the most-
famous creators and performers. The Directive’s enactment sets up a 
potentially bleak future for creativity on the internet – a cornerstone of 
the web that users have come to expect – and set in place an internet for 
the haves, not the have-nots. Ultimately, the Digital Single Market 
Directive is not net neutral and not in the general consumer’s best 
interest. 
 
** Nathan Guzé, J.D. is a 2020 graduate of Loyola Law School. He also holds an M.A. in Music 
Industry Administration from California State University Northridge and a B.A. in Music from 
the University of California Riverside. This paper is a student note written primarily in 2018-19. I 
would like to thank my fiancé Chelsea McCants for her support throughout law school, Professor 
Atik for his advice and guidance on this paper, and the rest of the Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review for their assistance in this note’s creation. It was 
wonderful to work with you all for two years. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright laws are essential to incentivizing artists, authors, 
inventors, and other visionaries to engage in creative pursuits and to 
share the fruits of their labor with the rest of society. These laws 
provide peace of mind to these creators and copyright owners by 
ensuring their compensation and control over the works and punishment 
for infringers. In 2018, the European Union’s governing bodies 
proposed a new Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market 
(“DSM Copyright Directive”). If adopted by its member states, the 
directive will regulate the enforcement against copyright infringement 
and the unauthorized use of copyrighted material in the online digital 
world.
1
 This directive includes the controversial Article 13,
2
 which has 
been dubbed the “meme ban” colloquially and the “value gap” 
provision officially. Catchy names aside, the implementation of this 
article could change how the internet functions around the world. 
A.  A Brief History of the Copyright Directive for the Digital Single 
Market 
In the late twentieth century, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) called for changes in member-state copyright 
laws.
3
 The United States provided initial drafts and spearheaded 
negotiations for the influential WIPO Internet Treaties.
4
 These proposed 
changes were forward-thinking and anticipated the many new and 
 
 1.   James Vincent, EU Approves Controversial Copyright Directive, Including Internet 
‘Link Tax’ and ‘Upload Filter’, VERGE (Sep. 12, 2018, 7:12 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/9/12/17849868/eu-internet-copyright-reform-article-11-13-approved (report on the Sept. 
2018 European Union approval of new Copyright Directive language. Criticizing Articles 11 and 
13 and states that a vote is likely in January 2019).      
 2. Note that the European Parliament’s approved language of the Copyright Directive for 
the Digital Single Market has renumbered the value gap provision/meme ban from Article 13 to 
Article 17. For the sake of continuity with external materials, it shall be referred to as Article 13 
in this article. See Resolution of 26, March 2019 on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
(COM 0593), 121 (2019). 
 3. Mihály Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The WIPO Internet Treaties, 21 COLUM. 
- VLA J.L. & ARTS 197, 197–99 (1997) (discussing the negotiation process behind the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”) and the 
subsequent agreements. Providing the unique identifier “WIPO Internet Treaties”).  
 4. Mihály Ficsor, The WIPO “Internet Treaties” The United States as the Driver: The 
United States as the Main Source of Obstruction — As Seen by an Anti-Revolutionary Central 
European, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 17, 20–27 (2006) (discusses the United States’ 
role in implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties and how that affected the adoption of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act). 
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changing roles copyright would play in the internet age. Ultimately, the 
signing of the treaties resulted in the United States adopting the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 1998.
5
 This act made the 
copying and dissemination of creative digital works found in the form 
of computer files unlawful.
6
 Furthermore, it created ‘safe-harbor’ laws, 
which allow for-profit online content sharing service providers to avoid 
liability for hosting user-uploaded content that contains or is comprised 
of copyrighted materials.
7
 
The European Union initially adopted a similar provision under 
their “Directive on Copyright in the Information Society” (“InfoSoc 
Directive”) that brought it in compliance with the WIPO Internet 
Treaties to which it signed.
8 However, the resulting European Union 
Copyright law came under scrutiny as the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (“CEPS”), many European copyright holders, and content 
owners claimed it did not go far enough to protect copyright holder 
rights.
9
 These critics felt as though the InfoSoc Directive failed to 
sufficiently protect copyright-protected works in modern Europe.
10
 In a 
study, CEPS determined that although the InfoSoc Directive aligned 
European Union legislation with international law, the directive failed 
on multiple fronts; including strengthening intellectual property 
protection in light of emerging technological developments, reducing 
the existing disparities between national legal systems, and ensuring an 
adequate level of remuneration and compensation of authors and 
performers.
11
 Today, computers with internet access can easily find and 
download songs, videos, articles, photographs, or other creative works 
 
 5. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, § 512, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 2877. 
 8. European Commission Press Release IP/01/528, Commission Welcomes Adoption of 
the Directive on Copyright in the Information Society by the Council (Apr. 9, 2001) (press 
release that announced European Union’s passing of earlier version of Copyright directive. 
Briefly discusses some of the law’s provisions); WIPO Copyright Treaty Contracting Parties, 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_
id=16 (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) (shows which countries are signatories to WCT. Shows when 
European Union and United States both signed on to the treaty). 
 9. See generally ANDREA RENDA ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND 
EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2015), https://
www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/SR120_0.pdf (identifying problems with the European 
Union’s earlier Copyright directive. It found that its similar-to-DMCA provisions were 
inadequately protecting European Union copyrights and called for a new European Union 
copyright directive). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at ii, iii. 
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its user desires. While it has recently become easier to legitimately 
obtain and use copyrighted works via subscription streaming services, 
one-time downloads, and other methods, it is still not difficult to 
download the work without authorization from or payment to its rights-
holder. 
The European Union’s DSM Copyright Directive seeks to address 
these issues that worry policy makers and copyright holders. However, 
it brings to a head an important policy consideration that is essential for 
any society to acknowledge in today’s internet-age: ensuring that 
authors’, artists’, publishers’, and other creative and technology-based 
industry members’ concerns in protecting their works are balanced with 
the consumers’ rights in the internet-age. This note seeks to bring that 
consideration to the DSM Copyright Directive. 
B.  An Examination of Net Neutrality 
Net neutrality must first be considered before the new directive can 
be examined. Not one widely-accepted definition for this policy exists.
12
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “net neutrality” as “the idea, 
principle, or requirement that internet service providers (“ISPs”) should 
or must treat all internet data as the same regardless of its kind, source, 
or destination.”
13
 At the very least, a widely accepted definition must 
include “the general principles that owners of the networks that 
compose and provide access to the internet should not control how 
consumers lawfully use that network, and they should not be able to 
discriminate against content provider access to that network.”
14
 
This note will use “net neutrality” to describe the concept of the 
internet as a place for the free and open exchange of information. It is 
achieved through a network owner’s “neutral” approach to handling and 
delivering web data, no matter where it comes from or where it goes.
15
 
This thereby requires internet service providers, content hosts, and other 
online gate-keepers to not prohibit, filter, or redirect users from most of 
their desired search results. It also requires governments and societies to 
treat network owners as mere conduits of data exchange who should be 
severely limited in their liability only regarding what data is transferred. 
 
 12. ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40616, THE NET NEUTRALITY 
DEBATE: ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS 1 (2019). 
 13. Net Neutrality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/net%20neutrality (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
 14. GILROY, supra note 12, at 1. 
 15. Seriously troublesome materials such as child pornography are exempted from the 
neutrality requirement of this definition. 
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Consumers have much to gain under a net neutral internet. Such an 
internet preserves consumers’ rights to be protected from network 
owners’ control of data by ensuring that they cannot filter content 
without a court order.
16
 By prohibiting the speech filtration that 
characterizes monopolized and oligopolized internet communications, a 
net neutral internet would also foster free and democratic 
communications.
17
 Further, a net neutral internet would encourage 
competition and innovation by allowing the quality of websites and 
web-services to dictate their success rather than mere deals with 
network owners.
18
 
However, net neutrality sacrifices some concepts that consumers 
may find desirable. In response to market demands, network owners 
may wish to offer various price levels for different service levels that 
consumers may find desirable in their internet use. This is often 
presented by offering different service packages that allow consumers 
access to different categories of online services depending on which 
package or packages are selected.
19
 Because more consumers are able to 
buy in to less expensive partial internet access, network owners may 
then continue to invest in networks and internet infrastructure for the 
benefit of consumers.
20
 
Implementation of net neutrality principles could also lead to 
increased costs for internet access that could effectively block access to 
it by those who cannot afford it.
21
 Many internet service providers 
provide partial internet access to the poor for free or at reduced costs 
under a ‘zero rating’ concept.
22
 Under this concept, internet service 
 
 16. PETER PHILLIPS, CENSORED 2007 at 34 (2006). 
 17. Lawrence Lessig and Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST  
(Jun. 8, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/07/AR200606
0702108.html.  
 18. SaveTheInternet.com Frequently Asked Questions, FREE PRESS ACTION FUND, https://
web.archive.org/web/20081211200309, http://savetheinternet.com/%3Dfaq (last visited Apr. 12, 
2019). 
 19. See, e.g., Tarifários Móveis Pós-pagos Unlimited, MEO+SMART NET, https://web.
archive.org/web/20171214100904/, https://www.meo.pt/telemovel/tarifarios/unlimited (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2019).  
 20. J. Gregory Sidak, What is the Network Neutrality Debate Really About?, 1 INT’L J. 
COMM. 377, 384 (2007). 
 21. Brian Fung, Jesse Jackson is lobbying the FCC against aggressive net neutrality rules, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/11/18/
jesse-jackson-is-lobbying-the-fcc-against-aggressive-net-neutrality-rules/?utm_term=.
b6643bbdcddf.  
 22. Scott Canon, Digital Life: The Trump Path to Free Internet for the Poor, KAN. CITY 
STAR (May 19, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/business/technology/article151477557.
html. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI 10/7/2020  6:49 AM 
68 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:1 
 
providers accept payment from certain websites and online services in 
exchange for exemptions from data caps.
23
 This would allow poorer 
users to use bandwidth-hogging services without exceeding their data 
caps, as their data usage for that website or online service has already 
been paid.
24
 However, this can be abused by interests who pay network 
owners to only allow consumers to access their content. 
C.  The Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market Rejects Net 
Neutrality 
The European Union’s DSM Copyright Directive is a decision to 
reject net neutrality. By mandating an expanse of copyright protections 
via content filtration systems and increased liability for network owners, 
the European Union is cauterizing a generation’s creative abilities by 
denying them the deliberate, legitimate, and fair use of works by other 
authors through algorithmic content filters. The potential for abuse is 
substantial, as these laws can be used to deny rights to free expression 
and speech by restricting access to online data that is essential to 
fostering and supporting the creation of original ideas under the guise of 
copyright protection. 
However, the new proposal is not without its merits. Copyright 
laws exist to give creators and rights-holders a chance to profit and 
trade their creatively produced works. This new directive seeks to solve 
the issue of content piracy, which has perplexed many industries since 
the inception of the internet. While some artists and creators seem to 
live extravagantly off of their creative successes, there are many others 
who remain anonymous because of the ease of access the internet 
provides to the more famous works of others. All a consumer needs to 
do in order to find the song that is stuck in their head is to search for it 
on YouTube or Google, and more often than not they can find the song 
for free. Even if there is an official version available that is free or 
inexpensive, one may easily find other versions that divert funds and 
viewership away from the song’s original author. This has created what 
the authors of the copyright directive call “the value-gap,” or the gap 
between the money content hosts make from user generated content and 
 
 23. Id.; CONSUMER REPORTS, What are broadband data caps and should you be 
concerned about them?, (June 24, 2015), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/06/
broadband-data-caps/index.htm (defining “data caps” as “monthly limits on the amount of data 
you can use over your Internet connection”). 
 24. Fung, supra note 21. 
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the money they pass on to copyright holders.
25
 In response to 
stakeholders’ requests (such as European copyright holders), and in an 
attempt to comply with WIPO international treaty requirements, the 
directive contains two major articles that, if passed into member state 
national law, would bring substantial changes to European copyright 
regimes.
26
 
First, this article will examine the history behind Article 13 of the 
DSM Copyright Directive. It will start by reviewing standards set by the 
WIPO in the multilateral ‘Internet Treaties’ signed by the European 
Union. It will then consider how the European Union originally 
implemented these standards in the InfoSoc Directive. The InfoSoc 
Directive’s criticisms will then be examined to see how it gave life to 
the DSM Copyright Directive. 
Section Two of this article will dive deeper into the concept of ‘net 
neutrality’ and its relationship with the DSM Copyright Directive. It 
will examine hypotheticals and real world examples of net neutrality 
violations in both corporate and government-backed settings. It will 
then examine the European Union’s history with net neutrality. These 
examinations will help conclude that the DSM Copyright Directive 
really is not net neutral. 
Section Three will then specifically examine the language of 
Article 13 to determine that it is not net neutral. Article 13’s major 
provisions are themselves not net neutral, such as the elimination of 
safe-harbor provisions and the requirement for content filters. 
Section Four will then consider who stands to win and lose under 
the DSM Copyright Directive. Determining why this matters will 
further prove who the winners and losers are, which will help the reader 
understand that important net neutrality interests truly are at stake with 
the DSM Copyright Directive’s passage, for the benefit of a select few. 
The final section will attempt to predict how the future internet 
will look like with the non-net-neutral DSM Copyright Directive 
enacted, and whether it is worth passing. Ultimately, this note will make 
a case for the importance of at least maintaining the internet’s status-
quo, and at most making it more net neutral. 
 
 25. Mark Sutherland, Rights-Holders Pile on ‘Value Gap’ Pressure as Article 13 End 
Game Nears, MUSIC WEEK (Dec. 14, 2018), http://www.musicweek.com/labels/read/rights-
holders-pile-on-value-gap-pressure-as-article-13-end-game-nears/074779 (defining “value gap”). 
 26. Dave Keating & Peter O’Donnell, Battle on EU Copyright Law Re-opened by 
Commission, POLITICO (May 12, 2012, 11:05 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/battle-on-eu-
copyright-law-re-opened-by-commission/. 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY BEHIND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COPYRIGHT 
DIRECTIVE FOR THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET 
Both the European Union’s and the United States’ copyright 
regimes stem, in part, from their respective agreements to implement 
what has come to be known as the WIPO “Internet Treaties.”
27
 This 
consists of two separate treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”), 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”).
28
 The 
European Union and the United States signed these treaties in 1996 and 
1997, respectively.
29
 The United States ratified the treaties in 1999 and 
they went into effect in 2002.
30
 The European Union ratified the treaties 
a decade later in 2009, and they went into force in 2010.
31
 
The WCT was particularly important in setting the foundation for 
both the United States’ and the European Union’s current copyright 
regimes, as it called for an absolute bar on the circumvention of 
technological measures that protect copyrighted works.
32
 Notably, the 
WCT also called for software and databases to be eligible for copyright 
protection, too.
33
 Since the decision in Feist Publications v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.,
34
 the United States has adhered to this WCT 
provision by providing copyright protection to “factual compilation[s] 
[such as databases] if it features an original selection or arrangement of 
facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or 
arrangement. In no event may copyright extend to the facts 
themselves.”
35
 While the European Union provides similar copyright 
protections for creatively arranged databases,
36
 it contrastingly provides 
sui generis protection rights for databases “which show that there has 
been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in 
either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents . . . .”
37
 
 
 27. RENDA ET AL., supra note 9, at 2. 
 28. WIPO Copyright Treaty Contracting Parties, World Intell. Prop. Org., https://www.
wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (last visited Aug. 28, 2019); WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 5, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997). 
 29. WIPO Copyright Treaty Contracting Parties, supra note 28. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. WIPO Copyright Treaty, arts. 11-12, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, 4. 
 33. Id. at arts. 2-3. 
 34. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991). 
 35. Id. at 350-51. 
 36. Directive 1996/9, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on 
the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 3, 1 (EC). 
 37. Id. at 9. 
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The WPPT was notable in that it granted protections to performers 
and producers of phonographs. It called for the extension of “moral 
rights” to performers and their fixed and unfixed performances.
38
 Moral 
rights are an author’s non-economic right to claim authorship of a work 
and to object to any sort of negative modification of their work that 
would prejudice their honor or reputation, even after the economic 
rights have been transferred to a new owner.
39
 This treaty also gave 
performers and producers alike the right to reproduce, distribute, and 
rent out their performances and phonographic recordings
40
 for a term of 
fifty years either after the performance became fixed or when the 
phonograph was published.
41
 While these rights for producers and 
performers were certainly groundbreaking, arguably, the most 
noteworthy aspects of the WPPT can be found in Articles 18 and 19. 
Similar to Articles 11 and 12 of the WCT, Articles 18 and 19 of the 
WPPT called for an absolute bar on the circumvention of technological 
measures that protect copyrighted works,
42
 and for the creation of 
adequate legal remedies and protection against such circumventions.
43
 
In order to align its laws with WIPO multilateral treaty obligations, 
increase intellectual property protection and profitability, and create 
uniform European copyright laws, the European Union Parliament first 
passed copyright laws for the digital era in its 2001 InfoSoc.
44
 Before 
the InfoSoc Directive’s implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties, 
member state governments implemented their own individual copyright 
laws. The Infosoc Directive attempted to harmonize copyright law 
across Europe by replacing an estimated “two-thirds of national 
copyright laws” with pan-Europe legislation.
45
 The InfoSoc Directive 
also implemented many of the WIPO Internet Treaties’ provisions, 
including legal penalties for the circumvention of technological 
safeguards.
46
 Thus, in many respects, the InfoSoc Directive was similar 
to the United States’ DMCA. 
 
 38. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 28. 
 39. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 
1886, as last revised, at Paris July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 40. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 28, at 4-6. 
 41. Id. at 7.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. RENDA ET AL., supra note 9, at 13. 
 45. Id. at 6. 
 46. Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 6, 1 (EC). 
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A.  Criticism of the InfoSoc Directive Leads to its Reconsideration 
The InfoSoc Directive sought to achieve four goals for European 
Copyright law: (1) align European Union legislation with international 
copyright law, (2) strengthen intellectual property protections in the 
digital era, (3) reduce existing disparities between member-state 
national legal systems regarding copyright law, and (4) ensure adequate 
levels of remuneration and compensation for authors and performers.
47
 
Internal European Union reports conducted by the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (“CEPS”) determined that the InfoSoc Directive 
adequately achieved its first goal by implementing the three-step test for 
intellectual property rights exceptions and limitations into European 
Union Member State’s laws; broadening the definition of intellectual 
property rights, and endorsing anti-circumvention measures as a viable 
means of enforcing copyright laws against individual actors.
48
 However, 
CEPS went on to later determine that the InfoSoc Directive only 
partially achieved, or even failed to achieve its other goals.
49
 
Per the CEPS report, the InfoSoc Directive failed to adequately 
enforce copyright laws to the extent that European Union legislators 
envisioned.
50
 It relied heavily on prosecuting and enjoining those who 
circumvent technological protection measures.
51
 However, these 
protective measures turned out to be an inferior means of protecting 
online content, as circumventors were hard to locate and take to 
court.
52
As a result, one of the few options available to infringed-upon 
copyright holders was to seek an injunction against online 
intermediaries for the takedown of infringing content, rather than 
seeking redress with the infringing content posters themselves.
53
 
However, CEPS determined these injunctions were inadequate because 
of the many protections content hosts enjoyed due to their status as 
 
 47. RENDA ET AL., supra note 9, at 125. 
 48. Id.; see generally About CEPS, CEPS https://www.ceps.eu/about-ceps/ (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2019) (stating CEPS is a private non-profit Brussels-based “think-tank and forum for 
debate on European Union affairs” that “offer[s] exchanges, [and] provide[s] insights and 
potential solutions for EU policy….” It gets its funding through corporate and institutional 
membership fees, project research, foundation grants, conference fees, and publication sales.);  
CTR. FOR EUR. POLICY STUD., ANNUAL REPORT 2017–2018 at 27-28 (2018), https://www.ceps.
eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CEPS_Annual-Report-2017.pdf (detailing sources of funding via 
pie chart, including various EU Federal and Member State, corporate, and private funding). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 126. 
 51. Id. at 125. 
 52. Id. at 126. 
 53. Id. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2020  6:49 AM 
2019  Net Neutrality and the EU’s Copyright Directive 73 
 
“mere conduits” under the InfoSoc Directive and other similarly 
situated European Union Directives.
54
 Thus, there were few options for 
copyright holders to seek enforcement of their copyrights, rendering the 
InfoSoc Directive impotent as a means of protection. 
The InfoSoc Directive also faced a major issue in regard to 
member state implementation. Because the European Union sought to 
strengthen copyright protections and the InfoSoc Directive had to reflect 
the WIPO Internet Treaties’ obligations, the Directive’s goal of creating 
a homogenous internal market was found incompatible and was forced 
onto the back burner.
55
 Furthermore, member states’ implementation of 
varying exceptions and limitations of the WIPO Internet Treaties’ three-
step test led to a wide variety of copyright regimes across the Union.
56
 
CEPS’s last criticism was in regard to the InfoSoc Directive’s 
inability to ensure adequate levels of remuneration and compensation 
for a majority of copyright holders.
57
 This inability was based on the 
Directive’s reliance on vague terms such as “market mechanisms,” 
“appropriate rewards,” and “fair compensation” for authors and 
performers to determine the fair value of a copyrighted work via a 
hands-off approach.
58
 Ultimately, CEPS’s major issue with the 
perceived inadequate remuneration levels was that fair remuneration in 
the InfoSoc Directive was not based on a “‘fair’ distribution of revenues 
along the value chain for legitimate uses of creative content . . . which 
generate the bulk of the revenues,” but rather on “unauthorized but 
legitimate… uses of an author’s or performer’s creative content.”
59
 
CEPS further based its “market forces” criticism of fair 
remuneration on the fact that the InfoSoc Directive failed to determine 
what “fair remuneration” is and how it is determined.
60
 CEPS 
acknowledged “the uniform interpretation of equitable remuneration 
implies that Member States should ensure a proper balance between the 
interests of performers and other right-holders, in relation with the 
economic value of the use under consideration.”
61
 However, this 
provided little guidance in determining what “fair remuneration” 
actually is. This was further complicated by contractual provisions that 
 
 54. Id.; see also Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J (L 178) 12-1(EC).  
 55. RENDA ET AL., supra note 9, at 126. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 108-09. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 110. 
 60. Id. at 108-09. 
 61. Id. at 111. 
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Member States allow relevant parties to make in determining the final 
remuneration amount to authors and performers.
62
 
CEPS’s final criticism on the determination of adequate 
remuneration to authors and performers under the InfoSoc Directive 
was, in part, based off of a perception that such remuneration was based 
on a compensation-per-use approach rather than a lump-sum 
approach.
63
 Their report determined this approach disproportionately 
benefitted “best-selling” authors, as opposed to less-than-successful 
authors.
64
 Pay-per-use placed more entrepreneurial risk and per-
transaction costs on the author/performer, who may not want to or be 
able to take these on.
65
 Lump sums however shielded an 
author/performer from unexpected negative shifts in market 
consumption patterns.
66
 
The CEPS report on the InfoSoc Directive led Members of 
European Parliament (“MEPs”) to agree to reconsider Europe’s 
copyright regime.
67
 In 2012, the European Commission announced it 
would review the InfoSoc Directive to identify and eliminate its 
inefficiencies.
68
 
B.  The Jean-Claude Juncker Presidency and the Rise of the Digital 
Single Market 
After the election of Jean-Claude Juncker to the European Union 
presidency in 2014, the Union attempted to create a Digital Single 
Market (“DSM”).
69
 In one of his first official communications, 
President Juncker stated: 
A Digital Single Market is one in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured and where 
individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise 
online activities under conditions of fair competition, and a 
 
 62. Id. at 112. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Dave Keating & Peter O’Donnell, Battle on EU Copyright Law Re-opened by 
Commission, POLITICO (May 12, 2012, 11:05 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/battle-on-eu-
copyright-law-re-opened-by-commission/. 
 68. Id. at 2.  
 69. European Commission Memo MEMO/14/523, Questions and Answers: The Juncker 
Commission (Sep. 10, 2015) (discussing Pres. Juncker’s creation and implementation of 
European Union’s Digital Single Market. Outlines legislators/legislative bodies that will be 
involved). 
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high level of consumer and personal data protection, 
irrespective of their nationality or place of residence. 
Achieving a Digital Single Market will ensure that Europe 
maintains its position as a world leader in the digital economy, 
helping European companies to grow globally.
70
 
In his call for a European DSM, President Juncker also called for the 
weakening of European telecommunications regulations and the 
reduction of copyright and data protection legislation.
71
 He argued that 
this would increase Europe’s ability to take advantage of borderless 
digital technologies.
72
 
President Juncker then assigned the Vice-President of the DSM 
and others in the cabinet to determine the proper steps to the 
implementation of a European DSM.
73
 Upon finding that a DSM could 
increase the European Union’s gross domestic product by up to €415 
billion per year, and that the InfoSoc Copyright Directive could be 
salvaged and made effective, the European Parliament affirmed support 
for the creation of the DSM.
74
 However, in order to create this DSM 
that President Juncker imagined, the flawed 2001 InfoSoc Copyright 
Directive would need to be revisited. 
 
 70. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Single 
Market Strategy for Europe, at 1, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1447773803386&uri=CELEX:52015DC0192 [hereinafter A Digital 
Single Market Strategy for Europe]. 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. Id. at 2. 
 73. European Commission Memo MEMO/14/523, supra note 69. 
 74. A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, supra note 70 (communicating the 
Commission’s desire to create European Union Digital Single Market. Says it must do so by 
breaking down telecommunications regulation and copyright legislation); European Parliament 
Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, EUR. PARL. DOCS. (P8_TA(2015) 
0273) (2015) (European Union Parliament vote on resolution to create and implement the 
European Union Digital Single Market. References WIPO “internet” treaties as influences in the 
creation of this project); see also European Commission Press Release STATEMENT/19/1839, 
Copyright Reform: The Commission Welcomes European Parliament’s Vote in Favor of 
Modernized Rules Fit for Digital Age (Mar. 26, 2019), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
STATEMENT-19-1839_en.htm [hereinafter Copyright Reform]. (The European Commission 
stating that the proposed Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market will “strengthen 
creative industries, which represent . . . 6.8% of [European Union] GDP . . . .” ). 
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C.   The Birth of the Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market 
The European Parliament renewed their efforts to address the need 
for a new comprehensive copyright directive for all of Europe. After 
about two years of discussions, the European Parliament decided on 
language for the DSM Copyright Directive’s first draft.
75
 In July 2018, 
318 MEPs voted against opening implementation discussions with 
European Union member countries, 278 voted in favor, and thirty-one 
abstained.
76
 Many MEPs feared that this directive would lead to 
censorship or filtration of the internet and restrictions on freedom of 
speech.
77
 
In September 2018, however, a revised version of the DSM 
Copyright Directive gained approval from the European Parliament and 
was set to be presented to member states for further discussion and 
implementation.
78
 Although it had much in common with its earlier 
June predecessor, it had some key differences. The revised DSM 
Copyright Directive specifically called for artists to receive payment 
when their works are shared partially or in their entirety on online 
content hosts.
79
 However, this proposed Directive exempted micro-and 
small-platforms from its mandates.
80
 The Directive also included 
provisions that Parliament thought would secure freedom of expression 
for Europeans.
81
 The text of this stage of the Directive also called for 
platforms to check for copyright infringing works upon their upload.
82
 
However, it called for this to be conducted in a way that avoided 
catching non-infringing works and that implemented adequate redress 
 
 75. EUR. PARL. DOCS. (P8_TA (2015) 0273), supra note 74. 
 76. Mark Sweeny & Jennifer Rankin, YouTube and Facebook Escape Billions in Copyright 
Payouts After EU Vote, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2018, 8:44 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/jul/05/youtube-could-escape-billions-in-copyright-payouts-after-eu-vote 
(discusses how the first version of the revised Copyright Directive was shot down and that a 
revised version was likely to come up in Sept. 2018). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Vincent, supra note 1 (report on the Sept. 2018 European Union approval of new 
Copyright Directive language. Criticizes articles 11 and 13 and states that a vote is likely in Jan. 
2019). 
 79. European Parliament Press Release, Parliament Adopts Its Position on Digital 
Copyright Rules (Sep. 12, 2018, 1:27 PM), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/
20180906IPR12103/parliament-adopts-its-position-on-digital-copyright-rules [hereinafter 
Parliament Adopts Its Position]. 
 80. Micro- and small-platforms are content hosts that are small in size, number of visitors, 
and services provided; Id. 
 81. E.g. Id. (sharing hyperlinks to news articles along with “individual words” would not 
be considered copyright infringement). 
 82. Id. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2020  6:49 AM 
2019  Net Neutrality and the EU’s Copyright Directive 77 
 
systems.
83
 Checking mechanisms, or content filtration systems, were 
required to be operated by human staff and could not be handled by an 
algorithm.
84
 It also gave artists the ability to claim additional 
compensation from platforms that see a great benefit from an artist’s 
work when the artist is receiving disproportionately low benefits from 
its use.
85
 This included claims to the platform’s indirect profits that 
result from the use of the artist’s work under threat of the artist revoking 
their license to the platform.
86
 
The European Parliament’s September 2018 vote approved the 
updated language for the DSM Copyright Directive and prepared it for 
tripartite negotiations between the European Commission, Counsel of 
the European Union, and the European Parliament.
87
 A conclusion to 
these ‘trilogue’ negotiations was initially expected in early 2019, 
whereupon language within the legislation would be up for agreement.
88
 
If the language had been approved then, the European Parliament would 
have proceeded to vote on whether to implement the Directive and the 
European Union’s individual Member States would have then been 
required to implement the Directive into their own national laws.
89
 
However, on January 18, 2019, the Council of the European Union 
rejected a mandate to continue negotiations on the language of the 
proposed DSM Copyright Directive with the European Parliament.
90
 
The Romanian-headed Council Presidency’s proposed language for the 
Directive was rejected by Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Slovenia, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Croatia, Luxembourg, and Portugal 
due to concerns about Articles 11 and 13.
91
 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Vincent, supra note 1 (report on the Sept. 2018 European Union approval of new 
Copyright Directive language. Criticizes articles 11 and 13 and states that a vote is likely in Jan. 
2019). 
 88. Julia Reda, Copyright Negotiations Hit a Brick Wall in Council, JULIAREDA.EU (Jan. 
18, 2019), https://juliareda.eu/2019/01/copyright-hits_wall/ (discussing stalled trilogue talks on 
Jan. 21, 2019 due to governing bodies’ disagreements on Directive language). 
 89. Vincent, supra note 1. 
 90. See generally Description of the Council of the European Union, EUR. UNION, https://
europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en (last visited Aug. 2019) 
(discussing the role of the Council of the European Union, including its composition of executive 
branch government ministers from member states who discuss, amend, and adopt laws, and 
coordinate policies. Together with the European Parliament, it is the main decision-making body 
of the Union that negotiates laws proposed by the European Commission). 
 91. Reda, supra note 88 (German MEP discusses Council’s rejection of the language of the 
Copyright Directive proposed by the Romanian Presidency). 
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The Romanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
then had the opportunity to come up with language for the proposed 
DSM Copyright Directive that adhered to the language approved in the 
September 2018 vote and that would still be passed by a qualified 
majority of the Council.
92
 A “qualified majority” is fifty-five percent of 
the Council that represents at least sixty-five percent of the European 
Union population.
93
 This was however further complicated by the 
upcoming elections for European Parliament in May of 2019.
94
 If an 
agreement on the proposed DSM Copyright Directive’s language could 
not be reached by then, it would have been up to the next legislative 
session to decide on the language, and even the viability, of the 
proposed Directive.
95
 However, due to the Directive’s long history of 
support within European Union governance and its well-funded 
proponents, a new legislative session of the European Parliament would 
have likely taken up the issue again. 
However, this contingency did not come to fruition because as of 
February 13, 2019, the Romanian delegation for the Presidency of the 
European Council has reached a provisional agreement with the 
European Parliament on the language of the proposed Copyright 
Directive.
96
 This language still contains most of the same controversial 
language that caused concern with Articles 11 and 13, however it did 
update language regarding exceptions and limitations, licensing 
practices, and copyright marketplace regulations.
97
 Even though the 
Romanian Presidency of the European Council and the European 
Parliament have provisionally agreed to this new language, it must now 
be submitted to the member states that comprise the Council and to the 
European Parliament for their confirmation.
98
 Upon approval of the 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Foo Yun Chee, In Win for Tech Giants, EU Copyright Reforms Stalled, REUTERS (Jan. 
21, 2019, 5:19 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-copyright/in-win-for-tech-giants-eu-
copyright-reforms-stalled-idUKKCN1PF1AO (discussing results of the Council of the European 
Union’s vote on the Copyright Directive in 2019). 
 95. Matt Reynolds, What is Article 13? The EU’s Divisive New Copyright Plan Explained, 
WIRED (May 24, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-article-13-article-11-european-
directive-on-copyright-explained-meme-ban. 
 96. Council of the European Union Press Release, EU Copyright Rules Adjusted to the 
Digital Age (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/
13/eu-copyright-rules-adjusted-to-the-digital-age/ [hereinafter EU Copyright Rules Adjusted]. 
 97. Council Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COD (2016) 6637/19 (Feb. 20, 2019), https://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6637-2019-INIT/en/pdf. 
 98. EU Copyright Rules Adjusted, supra note 96. 
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provisional language, the directive will again be submitted to both 
institutions for approval. A vote on this language was expected to take 
place in March or April of 2019.
99
 
In spite of protests directed at Article 13 and the DSM Copyright 
Directive, generally, from many European Union citizens and online 
platforms
100
 and petitions against the passing of the Directive,
101
 on 
March 26, 2019, the European Parliament approved a revised version of 
the DSM Copyright Directive by a vote of 348 in favor to 274 against, 
with thirty-six abstentions.
102
 As of this writing, the European Union 
member states will now have a chance to vote on approval of the DSM 
Copyright Directive text.
103
 If the text is accepted, member states will 
have two years to implement it into their national systems.
104
 Of the 
changes included in this revised version, the most notable is one of 
nomenclature. The often-vilified Article 13 has now been renamed to 
Article 17.
105
 These revised articles call for the exclusion of this 
Directive’s applicability to graphics interchange format files (“GIFs”), 
memes, and news article snippets and place lighter obligations on micro 
and small-content platforms.
106
 However, just because these contentious 
areas now seem to enjoy exemptions on the Directive’s face, it does not 
mean its operation will actually spare content platforms from 
infringement worries. 
II.  HOW DOES NET NEUTRALITY RELATE TO EUROPE’S COPYRIGHT 
DIRECTIVE REVISION? 
As initially discussed above, net neutrality names the principle that 
calls for internet service providers to enable access to all content and 
 
 99. Timothy B. Lee, European Governments Approve Controversial New Copyright Law, 
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 21, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/02/european-
governments-approve-controversial-new-copyright-law/. 
 100. Reaction as MEPs Back Controversial Online Copyright Reforms, EURONEWS (Mar. 
26, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/26/meps-back-online-copyright-reforms-that-
critics-fear-will-curtail-freedom-of-information; Morgan Meaker, Inside the Giant German 
Protest Trying to Bring Down Article 13, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2019); https://www.wired.co.uk/
article/article-13-protests. 
 101. Id. 
 102. European Parliament Press Release, 20190321IPR32110, European Parliament 
Approves New Copyright Rules for the Internet (March 26, 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/pdfs/news/expert/2019/3/press_release/20190321IPR32110/20190321IPR32110_en.pdf. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in 
the Digital Single Market, supra note 2. 
 106. Parliament Adopts its Position, supra note 79. 
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applications, regardless of the source and without favoring or blocking 
particular products or websites.
107
 Without net neutrality, internet 
service providers could intentionally block, slow down, or charge access 
to specific content and websites. Internet service providers have an 
incentive to violate net neutrality principles for a variety of reasons. The 
DSM Copyright Directive calls for provisions that would violate net 
neutrality principles. To help clarify these violations, it is important to 
consider both corporate and governmental net neutrality violation 
examples and hypotheticals to get an idea of how this proposed 
directive might actually play out. 
A.  Hypotheticals and Examples of Corporate Net Neutrality Violations 
In our first hypothetical, suppose that Comcast created original 
programming that competes with Netflix. In order to get Comcast 
consumers to stop using Netflix, Comcast could ‘throttle’ the streaming 
service—or intentionally slow down the flow of data from Netflix 
servers to the end consumer—with the goal of getting these consumers 
to choose Comcast’s comparatively faster streaming service instead. 
This throttling would lead to consumers not receiving what they 
specifically sought out and settling for a comparative service while 
internet service providers see undue revenue. In this hypothetical, the 
network owner unfairly tipped the balance on the scales of competition 
in their favor to the consumer’s detriment. 
Another worrisome hypothetical of a relevant net neutrality 
violation is when ISPs control a consumer’s ability to communicate 
with the digital world to the providers’ benefit. For example, suppose a 
consumer wishes to order new shoes from Amazon. AT&T could block 
this consumer’s access to Amazon by various means, thereby blocking 
the consumer from making their intended purchase and stopping 
Amazon from making a sale. Additionally, in this hypothetical, suppose 
AT&T is also paid by Target to redirect consumers to the Target 
website whenever this consumer wishes to shop on Amazon. AT&T 
could then direct the consumer away from their desired online store, 
which may result in a purchase the consumer did not intend to make 
from a company they did not intend to buy from. This also denies 
Amazon the money from the sale they should have been able to make. 
These may seem like incredible hypotheticals of net neutrality 
violations, and indeed these two are intended to be extreme. Regardless, 
 
 107. GILROY, supra note 12, at 1. 
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there have been net neutrality violations by companies in the past. 
While not as egregious as the above violations, they are close enough 
that they should cause consumers to pause and consider what might 
happen next time a company decides to violate net neutrality. 
In one real-world net neutrality violation example from 2009, 
Apple was required to remove all Skype apps from its app store by its 
then exclusive U.S. carrier AT&T. 
108
 The telecommunications giant 
was threatened by competition from the free voice-over-internet-
protocol app, as it provided a widely popular and free or lower-cost 
alternative to AT&T’s cellular services.
109
 Apple was forced to block 
Skype calls over AT&T’s cellular networks in a violation of net 
neutrality after consumers showed they desired Skype’s services by 
making the app number one on the App Store best-seller list.
110
 
Consumers were unable to reap the benefits of healthy competition 
because another company filtered specific data from reaching 
consumers who desired its consumption. 
Another real-world example of the precarious nature of net 
neutrality came in 2011. Cell phone service provider MetroPCS sued 
the FCC to overturn recently implemented net neutrality regulations 
because it desired to block all audio and video streams on its customer’s 
phones except for YouTube data streams.
111
 This violated net neutrality 
rules because it locked MetroPCS customers out of other streaming 
platforms by ‘zero rating’ YouTube. This forced MetroPCS customers 
to support YouTube with no choice in the matter. T-Mobile eventually 
purchased MetroPCS and dropped the lawsuit in 2013.
112
 
B.  Hypotheticals and Examples of Governmental Net Neutrality 
Violations 
An extreme hypothetical net neutrality violation can come into 
effect when governments or political parties get involved. To illustrate, 
imagine a world where the European Union does not want its citizens or 
residents to discuss, foment, or learn anything about communism or 
 
 108. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Group Asks FCC to Probe iPhone Skype Restrictions, FORTUNE 
(Apr. 3, 2009), http://fortune.com/2009/04/03/group-asks-fcc-to-probe-iphone-skype-restrictions/. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Ryan Singel, Accused of Violating Net Neutrality, MetroPCS Sues FCC, WIRED (Jan. 
25, 2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/01/metropcs-net-neutrality-challenge/. 
 112. Adi Robertson, T-Mobile Drops Anti-Net Neutrality Lawsuit Filed by MetroPCS, 
Leaving Verizon on Its Own, VERGE (May 17, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/5/17/
4341280/tmobile-drops-metropcs-anti-net-neutrality-lawsuit. 
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fascism. The European Union could make a deal with European internet 
service providers to monitor every communication a European citizen 
makes, report these communications, ensure the communications do not 
go through, and block any search results the European Parliament 
deems not worthy of showing. However laudable a lawmaker’s 
intentions may or may not be in this hypothetical, this would constitute 
a violation of net neutrality that would only hurt constituents, 
democratic principles and institutions, and actual free-market 
innovations; violating the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, and 
privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights.
113
 
In 2018, governments from Egypt and Iran engaged in anti-net-
neutral practices that also violated human rights.
114
 These governments 
“rewrote restrictive media laws to apply to social media users, jailed 
critics under measures designed to curb false news, and blocked foreign 
social media and communication services.”
115
 These laws violate net 
neutrality by either prohibiting their citizens from accessing the 
‘undesirable’ content, or by targeting those users who might 
disseminate such ‘undesirable’ content online. 
C. Europe’s History with Net Neutrality 
As it currently stands, the European Union claims to support net 
neutrality, but that is not the entire truth of the matter. The European 
Parliament passed a regulation entitled “laying down measures 
concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on 
public mobile communications networks within the Union” that set the 
rules on open internet access.
116
 The regulation states that it: 
[A]ims to establish common rules to safeguard equal and non-
discriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet 
 
 113. See Felipe Romero-Moreno, ‘Notice and staydown’ and social media: amending 
Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright, 33 INT’L REV. L., COMPUTERS & TECH. 187, 
1, 14, 17 (2018) (discussing the proposed Directive on Copyright’s Article 13 and its violation of 
social media platforms’ and their users’ right to a fair trial and freedoms to privacy and 
expression under Articles 6, 8, and 10, respectively, of the European Convention on Human 
Rights); see generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms arts. 6, 8, 10, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 114. Adrian Shahbaz, The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2018 
(Freedom House, Wash. D.C.), Oct. 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_
2018_Final%20Booklet_11_1_2018.pdf.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Council Regulation 2015/2120, 2015 O.J. (L310) 1 (EU). 
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access services and related end-users’ rights. It aims to protect 
end-users and simultaneously to guarantee the continued 
functioning of the internet ecosystem as an engine of 
innovation.
117
 
However, this regulation codifies exceptions that allow internet service 
providers to engage in non-net-neutral practices, such as allowing 
member states to determine the viability of commercially-driven zero-
rating practices, allowing internet service provider-determined “traffic 
management measures,” and permitting internet service providers to 
group traffic into classes.
118
 These loopholes have even been brought to 
the attention of European lawmakers who continuously vote to leave 
them open.
119
 
In comparison, the United States once had laws in support of net 
neutrality under the Obama and Bush administrations. However, under 
the Trump Administration’s Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) headed by Commissioner Ajit Pai, this principle has been all 
but eradicated. In December 2017, the FCC voted to dismantle these 
regulations, essentially reversing an FCC decision in 2015 for stronger 
net neutrality regulations. Commissioner Pai argued that repealing the 
regulations would allow for internet service providers to offer packages 
at competitive prices for price-conscious consumers.
120
 Accordingly, 
this stance exemplifies an extreme approach to anti-net-neutrality 
measures that Europe has not yet achieved. However, the European 
Union is continuing down its own path to a non-net-neutral regime by 
approving this proposed directive that requires strict algorithmic content 
filtration systems under the guise of increased copyright protections. 
Even though the United States has taken an anti-net-neutrality 
approach to internet regulations at the Federal level, state-level action 
may preserve these consumer-friendly regulations. For example, 
California has enacted regulations for internet service providers who 
wish to do business in the state.
121
 Specifically, in 2018 California 
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 118. Alex Hern, EU net neutrality laws fatally undermined by loopholes, critics say, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2015, 09:30), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/27/eu-net-
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limitations to the European Union’s net neutrality laws). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Repeals Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html.  
 121. S.B. 822, 2017-18 Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2018) (demonstrating language of recently-passed 
California net-neutrality bill which shows Californians have adopted laws similar to old FCC net-
neutrality rules (pre-Trump era). 
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passed Senate Bill 822, which has many of the same net-neutrality 
regulations the FCC had in place in 2015.
122
 
The European Union’s Federated system requires member states to 
enact a directive after the European Parliament and the European 
Commission have agreed on the directive’s language.
123
 As such, there 
is no chance for member states to ‘pull a California’ and reject this 
proposed Copyright directive. Thus, Europe is likely to follow the 
United States’ lead and become less net neutral. 
D.  The Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market is not Net 
Neutral 
Keeping in mind concerns of net neutrality violations by 
corporations and governments that could result in violations of freedom 
of privacy, freedom of expression, and a right to a fair trial,
124
 we now 
turn to how the net neutrality concept applies to the European Union’s 
DSM Copyright Directive. The European Union’s government is calling 
on internet service providers and content hosts to invade consumers’ 
private online activities, become monitors of artistic expressions, and 
filter user posts with algorithmic assistance. The proposed copyright 
directive would require large technology firms to violate net neutrality 
by monitoring uploads and communications between their users and 
blocking, or otherwise filtering, any attempts to upload copyrighted 
materials if they want to conduct business in Europe. 
Upon first impression, this may seem like a laudable goal because 
artists and authors should receive protection and due compensation for 
their work online, as they would through almost any other medium. 
However, there are plenty of uses of copyrighted materials that do not 
violate copyright laws but are difficult to legislate and implement 
exceptions around. These uses come in many forms, including but not 
limited to copying for private use, educational use, parodic or satirical 
use, and other fair uses. This could lead to the stifling of creative output 
to the detriment of European society, as the algorithmic filters that these 
gate-keepers would inevitably have to turn to are not sophisticated 
enough to make these fair-use determinations. Even human filters 
would not easily be able to make such determinations, as these are 
difficult legal questions that usually require time to litigate before a 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
288, signed Mar. 25, 1957 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 124. See Felipe Romero-Moreno, supra note 113. 
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determination can be made. The old adage applies: “all great artists 
borrow from those who came before them.” 
III.  EXAMINING ARTICLE 13 THROUGH A NET NEUTRALITY LENS 
Net neutrality provides an important focal point through which 
current and proposed copyright laws throughout the world should be 
examined. However, the purpose of this note is not to critique the 
institution of copyright laws in general. Current copyright regimes 
certainly have their merits and place within society, and their 
examination is reserved for a different discussion. Instead, net neutrality 
is used here to critically examine the European Union’s recommended 
expansion of copyright laws in the DSM Copyright Directive. 
Here, the expansion suggested by the DSM Copyright Directive is 
scrutinized. Specifically, the proposed expansion of rights against and 
new legal burdens upon ISPs and online content hosts under Article 13 
are criticized under a net neutrality lens. As of May 25, 2018, the 
Council of the European Union identified “closing the value gap” as a 
main reason for including Article 13 in the newly proposed Copyright 
Directive.
125
 They define the value gap as the difference “between the 
remuneration received by authors and performers and the profits made 
by internet platforms when they make their works accessible.”
126
 In an 
attempt to close this value gap, Article 13 eliminates important 
exemptions to copyright law. It is possible for economies and countries 
to benefit from net neutrality principles and status-quo copyright 
regimes, but anti-net-neutral copyright laws like those in the proposed 
Copyright Directive can be detrimental and should not be adopted. 
A.  Elimination of Safe-Harbor Protections 
One of Article 13’s biggest changes proposes the elimination of 
hosting exemptions, also known as ‘safeguard’ exemptions, for 
copyright infringement of for-profit online content-hosting providers.
127
 
 
 125. Council of the European Union Press Release, Copyright Rules for the Digital 
Environment: Council Agrees its Position (May 25, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2018/05/25/copyright-rules-for-the-digital-environment-council-agrees-
its-position/ [hereinafter Copyright Rules for the Digital Environment]. 
 126.  Id. 
 127. Copyright Reform, supra note 74.; see also Council Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, EUR. PARL. 
DOC. (COD 6637/19) (2016), https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6637-2019-
INIT/en/pdf; Interinstitutional Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market, COD (2016) 0280 (May 25, 2018) (discusses 
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Article 13 revives those exemptions for continued protection if online 
content sharing service providers take effective measures to prevent the 
availability of unlicensed and claimed copyrighted works, act quickly to 
remove them, and they show they have implemented effective steps to 
ensure infringement will not happen again.
128
 This mechanism creates 
an incentive for these online content hosts and ISPs to stop and prevent 
users from uploading materials that infringe on others’ copyrights 
altogether through the use of automated content filters. These filters are 
known to flag and take down legally permitted uses of copyrighted 
material, including fair use and licensed use, to the principle of net 
neutrality’s detriment. 
Article 13’s safe-harbor elimination provision exacerbates the 
potential for net neutrality violations. The Council of the European 
Union admittedly targets “online service providers whose main purpose 
(or one of whose main purposes) is to provide access to a large amount 
of copyright-protected content uploaded by their users for the purpose 
of making profits from organizing and promoting it.”
129
 This safe-
harbor elimination creates an unclear goal that will be difficult for 
network owners to achieve. Determining what a platform’s “main 
purpose” is, what a “large amount of copyright protected content” is, 
and what “making profits from organizing and promoting” copyright-
protected is will be exceedingly difficult and will require further 
definition from European Union governing bodies. Article 13 creates 
many ambiguities with little means to decipher them. 
B.  Content Filter Requirement 
While “filling the value gap” and “improving cooperation between 
rights holders and online platforms” seem like laudable goals on their 
face, further examination of Article 13 reveals some issues with these 
goals that should cause concern.
130
 False or wrongful claims of 
copyright infringement are already a source of controversy on online 
content hosting providers’ platforms thanks to content filters and 
copyright claim trolls. The DMS Copyright Directive would only 
exacerbate this problem. For example, it is not unusual for videos of 
 
approved language for Article 13. States that the tripartite negotiations on implementation can 
now take place. This same Article can be found in the latest version of the directive as Article 
17). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Copyright Rules for the Digital Environment, supra note 125. 
 130.  Id. 
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classical music covers (for which the sheet music has been in the public 
domain for hundreds of years) that are posted to Facebook to be claimed 
as a copyright infringement and subsequently taken down automatically 
without input from the poster.
131
 This is also a rampant problem on 
YouTube and similar content hosts, which has had negative subsequent 
effects on all kinds of original creative content.
132
 
Despite claims from the Council of the European Union that 
member-state implementation of the proposed Copyright Directive 
would not and cannot create or compound the current problems 
associated with automated content filters, companies that currently deal 
with such filters and who would be responsible for implementing them 
not only disagree, but wonder how this Directive could function without 
such automated filters.
133
 Content filters violate net neutrality because 
both algorithm and human-based filters stop users from receiving the 
flow of data they desire, including for lawful uses. History shows this 
failure of content filters almost always results in net neutrality 
violations. 
C.  Historical Inadequacies of Content Filters 
In 2015, YouTube’s automated content filter flagged and 
demonetized an original twelve-second video of a cat purring.
134
 
YouTube claimed that its filters identified the purring as the musical 
composition “FOCUS” whose rights are owned and controlled by EMI 
Music Publishing and PRS.
135
 MEP Julia Reda says that this 
 
 131. Cory Doctorow, The Future is Here Today: You Can’t Play Bach on Facebook 
Because Sony Says They Own His Compositions, BOING BOING (Sept. 5, 2018), https://
boingboing.net/2018/09/05/mozart-bach-sorta-mach.html. 
 132. See Tom Gerken, YouTube’s Copyright Claim System Abused by Extorters, BBC 
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47227937 [hereinafter Gerken, 
YouTube’s Copyright Claim]; Ulrich Kaiser, Can Beethoven send Takedown Requests? A First-
Hand Account of One German Professor’s Experience with Overly Broad Upload Filters, 
WIKIMEDIA FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://wikimediafoundation.org/2018/08/27/can-beethoven
-send-takedown-requests-a-first-hand-account-of-one-german-professors-experience-with-overly-
broad-upload-filters/; Cory Doctorow, Music Professor Shows How the EU’s Looming 
Extinction-Level Internet Policy Will Work (Fail), BOING BOING, (Sept. 4, 2018), https://
boingboing.net/2018/09/04/ludivico-technique.html. 
 133. Chee, supra note 94 (discussing the requirement to install upload filters); Reynolds, 
supra note 95 (discussing the implementation of automated content filters and the amended 
version of the Copyright Directive that disavowed the use of automated filters). 
 134. Ernesto Van Der Sar, YouTube Flags Cat Purring as Copyright Infringing Music, 
TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 11, 2015) https://torrentfreak.com/youtube-flags-cat-purring-as-copyright-
infringing-music-150211/. 
 135. Id. 
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“ridiculous” error, made after years of investing in filters, shows 
that ”[i]t’s extremely hard to get this technology right—if it is possible 
at all.”
136
 This example shows that content filters are highly likely to 
erroneously prohibit internet users from legitimately accessing the 
content they desire. This clear net neutrality violation example is not in 
isolation. 
Another content filter failure is their inability to identify lawful 
uses of copyrighted materials, such as for educational purposes. In 
2016, Harvard Law Professor William Fisher’s video lesson on 
copyright law was ironically flagged and taken down by YouTube’s 
automated filters because it contained clips of songs from Jimi Hendrix, 
Joe Cocker, and other artists.
137
 In another similar example, YouTube 
flagged NASA’s video footage of the Mars rover Curiosity’s landing for 
copyright infringement even though NASA was the video’s creator and, 
per U.S. government policy, the footage belongs in the public 
domain.
138
 Julia Reda claims that these takedowns show “[f]ilters can’t 
determine whether a use is covered by an exception. . . .” and that 
“[p]ublic domain content is at risk. . . .”
139
 These examples show net 
neutrality violations because internet users were denied access to 
lawfully consume the material they desired via exceptions to copyright 
laws that content filters are unable to compute. If this well-funded 
content filtration system cannot account for lawful uses of copyrighted 
materials, then users should not expect their rights to access these 
materials to be preserved. 
Filters have also been utilized by national governments across the 
world in violation of not only net neutrality principles, but of human 
rights ones, as well. The People’s Republic of China’s sweeping 2018 
Cybersecurity Law “. . . require[ed] that local and foreign companies 
work to ‘immediately stop transmission’ of banned content, and 
compel[ed] them to ensure that all data about Chinese users is hosted 
within the country.”
140
 Additionally, China’s ‘Great Firewall’ has 
 
 136. Julia Reda, When Filters Fail, (Sept. 28, 2017), https://juliareda.eu/2017/09/when-
filters-fail/. 
 137. Ernesto Van der Sar, YouTube Copyright Complaint Kills Harvard Professor’s 
Copyright Lecture, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 17, 2016), https://torrentfreak.com/youtube-copyright-
complaint-kills-harvard-professors-copyright-lecture-160217/. 
 138. Mike Masnick, How Google’s ContentID System Fails at Fair Use, TECHDIRT (Aug. 8, 
2012, 2:55 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120808/12301619967/how-googles-
contentid-system-fails-fair-use-public-domain.shtml. 
 139. Reda, supra note 136. 
 140. Shahbaz, supra note 114, at 6. 
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stopped their citizens from accessing non-government approved 
websites and apps that they may have otherwise desired to use.
141
 These 
measures implemented by the Chinese government are anti-net-neutral 
because they utilize content filtration systems to explicitly prohibit their 
citizens from consuming the content they desire and re-route them to 
government-approved equivalents.
142
 
Since content cannot be reasonably and correctly filtered with the 
use of automated algorithmic filters, an alternative and more accurate 
‘filter’ could be human beings. This approach seems to be what the 
European Union is envisioning. However, this is unrealistic because the 
sheer data volume uploaded to content hosts makes it near impossible 
for humans to keep up.
143
 Even if a human could process this immense 
amount of data, it would be impossible for them to give adequate and 
equal consideration to fair use, exempted non-infringing use, licensed 
use, and other justifications for the uploading of copyrighted material 
while still being able to address every piece of content in a timely 
manner. 
Creative works build off of ideas and other works created before it 
and, indeed, human ingenuity and advancements build upon the works 
that came before the latest development. In music, many songs rely on 
the use of chord progressions that have been around for hundreds of 
years. Many songs also sample other copyrighted works that are 
transformed when incorporated into a new work. In motion pictures and 
books, common themes and characters are constantly reused in plots. 
Without the work of countless computer scientists like Alan Turing, we 
would likely not have the modern computing systems we have today, 
and without the work of internet pioneers like Tim Berners Lee, we 
would likely not have the world wide web and even be discussing 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 7. 
 143. See generally Bree Brouwer, YouTube Now Gets Over 400 Hours Of Content 
Uploaded Every Minute, TUBEFILTER (Jul. 26, 2015), https://www.tubefilter.com/2015/07/26/
youtube-400-hours-content-every-minute/ (Reporting that 400 hours of video per minute were 
uploaded to YouTube in 2015); Melody Hahm, Facebook’s 3,000 New Human Content Monitors 
Won’t Prevent Violent Content, YAHOO! FINANCE (May 3, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/
news/facebooks-3000-new-human-content-monitors-wont-prevent-violent-content-
155248258.html (quoting Mark Zuckerberg, who said 3,000 human content monitors cannot 
catch every instance of wrongfully uploaded material and that artificial-intelligence-powered 
filters are the only viable option); CNN Business, Will memes be illegal? EU’s copyright 
overhaul explained, CNN (Mar. 29, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/26/tech/eu-copyright-
article-13/index.html (video explaining that 500 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube every 
minute). 
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regulation implementation. All of these examples show that access to 
and use of prior creative works are essential for the conception of new 
creative works. Indeed, many intellectual property regimes around the 
world provide legal exceptions for this sort of access. For a country or 
federation thereof to enact a law that uses content filters and network 
owner liability to stop or severely restrict the lawful transfer of data 
goes beyond the mere promise of exclusivity that is characteristic of 
intellectual property regimes and violates the important promises of net 
neutrality. 
IV.  WHO WINS UNDER THE COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE FOR THE DIGITAL 
SINGLE MARKET, WHO LOSES AND WHY DOES THIS MATTER? 
Under the European Union’s proposed DSM Copyright Directive, 
there will certainly be winners and losers in the contemporary internet 
law, copyright law, and antitrust law landscape. The DSM Copyright 
Directive will expand protections granted under member state copyright 
regimes. Subsequently, different groups of people will be affected 
differently. It is important to identify who these winners and losers are 
because it will shed light on why these groups may or may not value net 
neutrality principles and in turn whether society should support them. 
By showing who will benefit, it will help us place a value judgment on 
whether this proposed Copyright Directive is worthy of support. 
A.  Winners Under Article 13 
Right off the bat, it seems as though copyright holders will 
generally see extended benefits under the DSM Copyright Directive’s 
Article 13. Under this proposed article, copyright holders are 
empowered to negotiate licenses with online content hosts directly, as 
these service providers must seek authorization for the use of their 
copyrights under threat of liability for copyright infringement.
144
 The 
expansion of these copyright holders’ ability to bring suit for copyright 
infringement is something they would all expectedly applaud. However, 
further examination shows that not all copyright holders will benefit 
equally. 
 
 144. European Parliament legislative resolution of 26 March 2019 on the proposal for a 
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1.  Famous Artists and their Media Publishers 
Artists with large followings and their media publishers will 
disproportionately benefit from the proposed Copyright Directive. 
Considering their positions, their support for Article 13 is seemingly for 
good reason. Article 13 will allow famous copyright holders to directly 
negotiate with content hosts for greater rates of remuneration, especially 
if the content does better on the content host’s platform. If successful, 
this will take away from the available pool of remunerative funds that 
would otherwise be available for less-famous and little-known artists.
145
 
Famous creatives, including musical artists such as Paul McCartney, 
Placido Domingo, and Adele, along with European film leaders like 
Mike Leigh, Paolo Sorrentino, Margarethe von Trotta, and Agnieszka 
Holland all back this proposal.
146
 Additionally, organizations including 
the Federation of Screenwriters in Europe, the Society of Audiovisual 
Authors, the Independent Music Companies Association (“IMPALA”), 
and the France-based Confédération Internationale des Sociétés 
d’Auteurs et Compositeurs (“CISAC”) also back this proposed 
directive.
147
 
What media publishers and large artists fail to realize, however, is 
that laws affecting net neutrality affect their bottom lines, too. Under 
Article 13’s regime, consumers may be blocked from famous copyrights 
they wished to consume and redirected towards other famous copyrights 
or lesser-known copyrighted content alternatives, both of which the 
consumer did not originally seek out. This means that many media 
publishers’ and large artists’ famous copyrighted content will not be 
lawfully consumed by as many consumers as expected. In the end, this 
will lead to decreased overall remuneration and diminished negotiating 
power for higher licensing fees from content platforms to which these 
media publishers and large artists have become accustomed. 
Article 13’s implicit requirement for and overreliance upon content 
filters, whether code-driven or operated by humans, will make winners 
out of companies with deep-enough coffers to pay for filter code 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Scott Roxborough, What New EU Copyright Law Will Mean for Media, Tech 
Companies and Users, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 17, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://www.
hollywoodreporter.com/news/eu-copyright-directive-analysis-media-tech-internet-users-1144003; 
Nick Vivarelli, European Parliament Passes Copyright Directive Giving Artists Greater Share of 
Revenue, VARIETY (Sept. 12, 2018, 4:05 AM), https://www.msn.com/en-us/music/news/european
-parliament-passes-copyright-directive-giving-artists-greater-share-of-revenue/ar-BBNdYiO 
(discusses who the new Copyright Directive will likely affect positively and negatively). 
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development or for the enormous human workforce behind a filtration 
system to metaphorically hold copyrighted material for ransom. 
Invariably, it will be large technology firms that have the technological 
know-how or the availability of funds required for the development of 
content filtration systems.
148
 Those companies that have already 
developed such filters are now ahead of the game and stand to make a 
hefty profit from selling their content filters to online content hosting 
platforms who would rather purchase a final product rather than spend 
exorbitant amounts of time and money developing their own.
149
 These 
firms will then be able to dictate when copyrighted material may show 
up in search results, if it is to show up at all. They will also be able to 
dictate what other alternative content consumers should be redirected to, 
if any at all. If an alternative result is selected by a consumer, the holder 
of the original copyright has lost out on any possible remuneration. 
Ironically, companies like Alphabet and Facebook may actually see 
some benefit to the DSM Copyright Directive’s implementation, albeit 
one that the European Union Parliament did not intend.
150
 
B.  Losers Under Article 13 
1.  Content Hosts 
Online content hosting platforms will have the most to lose from 
implementation of Article 13’s provisions, as the proposed directive 
seems to be deliberately targeting this group. Platforms such as 
YouTube, Wikimedia, Twitch, GitHub, Automattic, Qwant, Patreon, 
UpCloud, Reddit, Bandcamp, Kickstarter, and more have come out 
against this directive.
151
 The opposition is unsurprising, given the legal 
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Final Update of Our Priorities for 2018, YOUTUBE CREATOR BLOG, (Oct. 22, 2018), https://
youtube-creators.googleblog.com/2018/10/a-final-update-on-our-priorities-for.html; Eileen 
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FOUND. (June 29, 2018), https://blog.wikimedia.org/2018/06/29/eu-copyright-proposal-will-hurt-
web-wikipedia/; Emmett Shear, A letter from our CEO about Article 13, TWITCH (Dec. 5, 2018), 
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ramifications and upending business effects that Article 13 would 
impose on these internet companies. 
The main points of contention these and many other online content 
hosting platforms have with Article 13 is the curb on legitimate free 
speech (despite the Directive’s claim to protect it).
152
 The limitation on 
free speech could be caused by the elimination of safe harbor provisions 
and the content filter requirements.
153
 This would force these businesses 
to either scrap their current business models and create new means of 
operation that comply with the new law while staying faithful to the 
service for which they have become relied upon for, or to buy expensive 
content filters from the few companies that make them. Both of these 
options are too expensive and time consuming for many of these 
platforms to reasonably implement. 
It is also unclear to many of these online content hosting platforms 
how exactly they should police their sites for infringing materials. A 
human force is clearly inadequate, yet algorithm-based content filters 
are prohibited by the DSM Copyright Directive.
154
 Content filters seem 
to be implicitly required, but they are also too imprecise to determine 
when fair use principles should apply, as discussed above. 
Additionally, the DSM Directive inadequately addresses the issues 
that would affect small to mid-sized online content hosting platforms. 
Article 17(6) does call for an exception to liability for online content 
hosting platforms that are younger than three years, make less than ten 
million Euros per year, and do not exceed five million unique monthly 
visitors.
155
 However, this exception is so limited that it would hardly 
apply to any online content hosting platforms. The smaller platforms 
that would meet this exception’s requirements, such as Patreon and 
DeviantArt, would still eventually be forced to implement expensive 
content filters or face copyright infringement claims if and when they 
grow out of this exception. 
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Combining the premise of free speech and the encouragement of 
innovation and creativity that many large and small content hosts alike 
are built on with the cost and liability-inducing proposals in Article 13 
creates a Catch-22 for these platforms. It is unclear how they can be 
expected to carry on with their business models, or make reasonable and 
affordable changes to them, while still complying with the law. This is 
especially troublesome when these online content hosting platforms 
regularly deal with falsified copyright infringement claims because 
costs and liabilities may only be exacerbated when content filters are 
mandated.
156
 
While it may be hard to sympathize with the prospect of increased 
copyright infringement scrutinization over some of these largely 
successful and profitable online content hosting platforms,
157
 it is 
important to note that any change to their business model would 
fundamentally change the way many of the creators operate to keep 
these platforms running. 
2.  Small to Medium-Sized Content Creators 
Article 13 has the chance of decimating a legitimate industry, 
including many European creators, by stopping small to mid-sized 
creators from engaging in what is often their part-time or full-time job. 
Both legitimate and illegitimate claims of copyright infringement are 
bound to flare up under mandated content filtration systems, which will 
constrain creators’ speech and innovation, much to the detriment of 
their consumers’ desires. Indeed, these artists and creators currently 
receive automated copyright infringement notices on their own creative 
works and are often unable to reap the benefits of their work.
158
 
Additionally, as discussed above, famous copyright holders’ 
ability to negotiate greater remuneration amounts with content 
platforms is troublesome for small to medium-sized creators. If famous 
copyright holders can take a larger slice of the remuneration-pie, little is 
left to compensate small to medium-sized creators for their work. Their 
incentives to create are destroyed, thereby nipping potentially-great 
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careers in the bud, and leaving less choice for consumers to enjoy 
overall. 
C.  Why Does Identifying Winners and Losers Matter? 
Identifying winners and losers illuminates a few scenarios which 
may totally or partially play out upon the DSM Copyright Directive’s 
pan-Europe implementation: (1) dominant technology firms will dictate 
what content appears in search results and when it appears, (2) user 
generated copyrighted content will be extremely difficult to access and 
consume, and/or (3) a resurgence of piracy will afflict the internet once 
again. 
1.   Disproportionate Control of Content Filters 
In the first scenario, dominant technology firms will create and 
control the few automated content filters that will be widely available 
since it would be too costly and time consuming for a smaller or less-
experienced firm to create one. Because of this, these dominant 
technology firms are incentivized to create non-net-neutral ‘packages’ 
that provide different capabilities at different price points for content 
hosts to consider. For example, at an expensive price-point, a dominant 
technology firm could offer a content filter that allows consumers to 
either get exactly what they searched for (provided the content exists on 
the platform) or provide results that the filter purchaser expressly 
desires. At a lower price point, a dominant technology firm could offer 
a content filter that provides consumers with results promoted by the 
dominant technology firm, without any input from the content host. 
Regardless, this will result in net neutrality violations to the detriment 
of consumers. 
This concentration of power over content filters may also 
incentivize collusive price-fixing behavior between dominant 
technology firms. Since these companies will know that the average 
consumer has nowhere else to turn to search for their desired 
copyrighted works, these dominant technology firms will be able to 
charge copyright holders higher prices in exchange for inclusion within 
search results. However, this is unlikely because such a move would 
contradict the anti-trust principles that guide the European Union’s 
internal market functions.
159
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2.  User-Generated Content Becomes a Thing of the Past 
The second potential scenario created by Article 13’s 
implementation, wherein user generated copyrighted content will be 
extremely hard to consume, should also cause concern for net neutrality 
advocates and small artist supporters alike. Under this scenario, the 
business model of many well-established content hosts would no longer 
be viable. This is because Article 13 would allow for lawsuits against 
these content hosts whenever a user successfully uploads another’s 
copyright-protected content to their platforms, and because small to 
midsize creators would be disincentivized from creating. 
To partially deal with this situation, these content hosts would 
have to either buy (what are likely to be) expensive content filters, or 
ban all content uploads from non-verified accounts. This less-expensive 
second option would destroy small, unknown, or fledgling authors from 
across the creative spectrum from sharing their creative content and 
exacerbate the problem. Accordingly, this would help entrench 
currently-famous authors’ positions as they would face little 
competition for copyright consumption. The internet would then 
become less creatively diverse and only populated by a limited amount 
of creative content. 
3.  Resurgence of Piracy 
The third potential scenario, in which piracy becomes a significant 
problem on the internet once again, should make net neutrality 
advocates nervous as well. If content filters are required to do business 
in Europe and companies cannot rely on safe-harbor provisions, then 
copyright protected content, in general, will become scarcer or more 
expensive to access. If a consumer is unable to find the content they 
desire at what they deem to be a reasonable price-point, they may turn 
to piracy to satisfy their content-driven desires. This would only serve 
to benefit torrenting websites and peer-to-peer networks, as they would 
see a resurgence in users. All copyright owners would therefore be 
harmed, as they would receive less remuneration and less control over 
their works. 
In the end, consumers will be most negatively affected by 
implementation of Article 13’s anti-net-neutrality principles. Consumers 
will be directed away from the content they originally sought out to 
consume and could be redirected to similar content they did not wish to 
consume. Online content hosts will be legally required to favor or block 
particular content from consumption, or be forced into purchasing or 
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developing their own expensive and anti-net-neutral content filters. In 
turn, ISPs would possibly even be legally required to favor or block 
particular content hosts altogether. In all, Article 13’s provisions would 
give internet consumers less choice in what content they may consume 
and when they may consume it. This expansion of copyright law is a 
block on not only net neutrality, but also on consumer rights. In the end, 
Big Tech may still prevail at the request and lobbying of famous artists 
and their media publishers, contrary to the European Union’s desires. 
V.  ARE THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF EUROPE’S DSM COPYRIGHT 
DIRECTIVE REALLY WORTH IT? 
Balancing the concerns of authors, artists, publishers, and other 
creative and tech institutions in the internet age with the rights of 
consumers is certainly a difficult dilemma, but it is not a new one. If 
this Directive was not adopted by member states and the debate ended 
there, how would copyright holders have coped in this digital age? 
When this Directive is enacted by member states, how would European 
Union citizens, and by extension, consumers affected around the digital 
globe, maintain their freedoms to make the consumer choices they 
desire without substantial input from online content hosting platforms, 
internet service providers, and governments that might not even be their 
own? Luckily, a few snapshots of what might come-to-be in a world 
where the DSM Copyright Directive exists. 
A.  Content Filters 
As mentioned above, YouTube is facing issues with a litany of 
falsified copyright infringement claims on their copyright-infringement-
detecting ContentID system.
160
 This ContentID system utilizes both 
algorithmic detection procedures and human flagging to identify 
potentially copyright infringing content in a similar fashion to Article 
13’s requirements. Neither algorithmic or human filtration on its own, 
nor in combination, has proven to be trustworthy because each method’s 
shortcomings are abused in a way that has drawn mass-scrutiny. Human 
flagger system abuse foments black-mail and extortion,
161
 which are 
rampant problems with little means of redress. Entire creator-backed 
channels have been taken down and livelihoods have been destroyed 
 
 160. Gerken, YouTuber in Row, supra note 158. 
 161. ObbyRaidz, YOUTUBE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM IS CORRUPT (I WAS EXTORTED) W/ 
INTERVIEWS, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNOYV3qC_GE. 
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thanks to the human-flagger system. However, the algorithmic detection 
portion of this system does not do much better. 
YouTube’s algorithm-based ContentID system is similar to the 
content filters that the DSM Copyright Directive calls to implement. 
This algorithmic filter automatically determines whether a video 
contains copyright infringing material.
162
 If the filter concludes that 
another’s copyrighted material is included in a video, the video may be 
taken down and ‘strikes’ may be levied against the uploader, which can 
eventually close their channel.
163
 However, in this situation, the 
identified copyright holder may choose to leave the video up and 
redirect the advertising revenue to themselves, instead.
164
 While these 
filters do not necessarily direct consumers away from the content they 
wished to consume, it may do so, or it may redirect advertising revenue 
away from where the consumer desired. This violates net neutrality 
principles. 
This system’s flaws are readily apparent. If the DSM Copyright 
Directive is ratified by member states, similar systems will become 
widespread and commonplace on internet traffic that stems from or goes 
through the European Union. This may lead to ubiquitous acts of 
blackmail, extortion, and general erroneous infringement claims that 
hurt European and worldwide consumers. If Google’s $100 million, ten-
plus-year-old ContentID system cannot control these phenomena, then 
the European Union and consumers cannot expect better results from 
any other online content hosting provider’s system.
165
 This flawed 
filtration system may even become the go-to filter as no other 
comparable systems exist to date. 
The final wording of Article 13, as approved by the European 
Union Parliament, shows that the European Union has attempted to 
solve this issue. Drafters have suggested that courts should grant passes 
to small online content hosting platforms that cannot afford to develop 
an algorithmic filtration system for the first three years in which they 
are in business if they make less than ten million Euros, and if they have 
less than five million unique monthly visitors.
166
 This does not propose 
 
 162. Gerken, YouTuber in Row, supra note 158. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Paul Sawers, YouTube: We’ve Invested $100 Million in Content ID and Paid Over $3 
Billion to Rightsholders, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 7, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/11/07/
youtube-weve-invested-100-million-in-content-id-and-paid-over-3-billion-to-rightsholders/. 
 166. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in 
the Digital Single Market, Article 17(6), supra note 2 at 125 (final wording of Article 13 as 
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an effective solution, however. In comparison to Google’s ten-year-long 
ContentID system development, three years is too short to create a 
comparatively effective system. Additionally, if and when a small 
online content hosting platform eventually graduates into the ‘major 
leagues,’ their efforts will be rewarded with a litany of lawsuits from the 
copyright holders who have waited for the company to reach a size 
worth suing. This could place these companies in danger of bankruptcy, 
which would ultimately disincentivize their original creation. This 
language therefore encourages these small online content-hosting 
platforms to find ways to skirt the law in ways that are yet unknown, 
remain small, or not be created in the first place. Thus, neither copyright 
nor net neutrality principles will be encouraged. 
B.  Elimination of Safe-Harbor Provisions for Content Hosts 
The DSM Copyright Directive’s safe-harbor provision elimination 
for online content hosting platforms and ISPs should worry every 
advocate for net-neutrality, free speech, and common-sense copyright 
law. If these network owners can face legal consequences via 
contributory copyright infringement for content uploaded by their users 
and customers, they have a large incentive to become cyberspace’s 
draconian secret censorship-police. This would effectively end the free 
and open internet that much of the world has known since its inception. 
This provision, in lockstep with the DSM Copyright Directive’s 
implied requirement for automated content filters, would result in a 
highly censored internet. This is what has spawned the “meme ban” 
moniker for Article 13,
167
 as it would stop most uses of copyright 
protected images that viral memes rely upon. Considering the amount of 
copyrighted material that is posted to the internet on a daily basis, 
whether infringing or not, the DSM Directive may create a scenario 
where network owners can be dragged into abundantly numerous 
lawsuits for contributory copyright infringement. Since content filters 
are not easily adaptable to non-infringing uses of copyrighted material, 
it would be easy to imagine that these network owners would place a 
general blanket-ban on the uploading of copyrighted materials in order 
for them to enjoy the greatest amount of legal protections. 
 
approved by the EU Parliament. Referred to as Article 17 in the latest proposal.); see also 
Timothy B. Lee, European Governments Approve Controversial New Copyright Law, ARS 
TECHNICA (Feb. 21, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/02/european-
governments-approve-controversial-new-copyright-law/.  
 167. Reynolds, supra note 95. 
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What we are likely to see result from the elimination of safe harbor 
provisions is an internet segmented into different packages that ISPs 
and content hosts can offer to consumers. Different packages at 
corresponding price points would allow access to greater levels or 
different kinds of copyrighted materials. These network owners will 
then be able to easily monitor uploads and downloads of copyrighted 
materials, discriminate against violators, and ensure that all inclusions 
of copyrighted materials are approved by their owners. Approval must 
come before consumption through faulty automated upload and 
download filters, regardless of lawful use. This may seem like a sound 
protection of copyrights, but it is actually a net neutrality proponent’s 
worst nightmare, made possible by an unsound expansion of the rights 
granted by the proposed directive. 
CONCLUSION 
Expanding copyright protections under the DSM Copyright 
Directive is not worth the likely impacts to the internet as it is now 
known. This should cause concern for net neutrality supporters because 
net neutrality stands for the principle that network owners should enable 
access to all content and applications regardless of the source, and 
without favoring or blocking particular products or websites.
168
 With a 
segmented internet, most consumers would not have access to all 
content and applications without regard to the source unless they have 
the requisite funds. Such a segmented internet would make it less useful 
as a tool to connect humanity’s knowledge, but the copyright holders 
may exert a little more control over their intellectual property. On 
balance, the DSM Copyright Directive is not a worthy endeavor. 
If a net neutral internet is too at odds with copyright laws for some, 
perhaps it is time to revisit the underlying concepts of copyright 
protections and update them to the twenty-first century instead of 
relying on an expansion of a twentieth century regulatory approach that 
could cripple the internet. Countries and federations should strive to 
keep the status quo that the early internet has enshrined: unfettered 
access to the largest network of human knowledge that still provides 
some protections to copyright holders without destroying the tool most 
important to keeping humanity informed, connected, and democratized. 
A net neutral internet is an economically viable one that protects human 
rights. The DSM Copyright Directive is posed to destroy this. 
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